The Local & the Global in Saudi Salafism by Al-Rasheed, M.
8  I S I M  R E V I E W  2 1  /  S P R I N G  2 0 0 8
Salafism
The Local & the Global 
in Saudi Salafism
Global jihad is a constructed category, 
perpetuated in the discourse of aca-
demics, think tank consultants, politi-
cians, policy makers, terror experts, and 
journalists on the one hand, and Jihadi 
ideologues and sympathizers on the 
other hand. The first group identify a 
global menace that requires the mobi-
lization of governments, military strat-
egists, civil society activists, and media 
campaigns across the world to justify 
the global War on Terror. The second 
group endeavours to mobilize Muslims across cultures, nations, and 
geographies in the pursuit of deterritorialized battles that nevertheless 
take place in specific localities, including world financial centres, train 
stations, and discos, expatriate residential compounds, tourist resorts, 
shrines, mosques, and markets.
The contradictions and tensions within the Saudi Jihadi project are 
the focus of this short exposition.1 Saudi Jihadis represent post-nation-
al non-state actors who draw on the rhetoric of the global jihad, yet 
remain immersed in the locality of Saudi Arabia.2 Rather than select-
ing famous contemporary Jihadi ideologues, this article draws on the 
messages of lesser known Saudi authors of Jihadi texts to demonstrate 
the centrality of the local in the global project: Faris al-Shuwayl writes 
about the priority of local jihad while Lewis Atiyat Allah3 glorifies the 
global project. Both seem to exhibit the tension between the local and 
the global. 
Contesting the local state
In both Faris al-Shuwayl and Lewis Atiyat Allah’s writings, the first 
Saudi state (1744-1818) is glorified as dawlat al-tawhid (the state 
of monotheism), a political entity unbounded by defined territorial 
boundaries, unrecognized by the international community, and uncon-
taminated by international treaties and legal obligations. The first state 
is a local political configuration that defied regional and international 
contexts and promised to make true Islam hegemonic. They regard this 
state as a revival of the state of prophecy where the community was 
subject to divine law. Membership was determined not by recognized 
frontiers but by submission to the rightful Imam, whose authority over 
distant territory was recognized by paying zakat, 
receiving his judges, and performing jihad under 
his banner. In the first state, unity was expressed 
in the belief in the one God, applying His com-
mands, and swearing allegiance to His political 
authority on earth.
Both Faris al-Shuwayl and Lewis Atiyat Allah re-
gard the main agent of this state to be Muham-
mad ibn Abd al-Wahhab rather than Muhammad 
ibn Saud; the former was the interpreter of God’s 
words while the latter was the executive force 
that enforced these words. This state had no 
name apart from dawlat al-tawhid, a deterritori-
alized polity pursuing the ultimate message of 
Islam, subjecting the individual to the sovereignty 
of God. As such, this state cannot be confined to 
man-made borders, cultural and historical factors, ethnic and linguistic 
considerations, or any other attribute common in defining the modern 
nation state. As such it was the ideal Muslim state that rebelled against 
blasphemy, religious innovations, and man-made law. The collapse of 
this state in 1818 at the hands of Ottoman troops temporarily sealed 
the fate of dawlat al-tawhid whose advocates impatiently waited for its 
revival in the twentieth century. 
In contrast, the current state of 1932 
evokes only negative responses among 
Saudi Jihadi Salafis. They contest its le-
gitimacy, name, law, borders, and for-
eign policies. Many of them regard it 
as an aberration of the first experience. 
They attribute its creation to an illegiti-
mate relationship with an infidel power 
(Britain). Its name “Saudi Kingdom” is 
denounced as a family fiefdom; its na-
tionality is rejected as a modern inno-
vation that is not anchored in Islamic 
text or historical practice; its foreign relations, especially its alliance 
with the West, violate the tenth principle of iman (faith) in Wahhabi 
theology, namely al-wala wa al-bara (association with Muslims and dis-
sociation from infidels). Against the global Jihadi message, the local 
state remains a rejected aberration. 
Faris al-Shuwayl (detained in Saudi Arabia since 2004), and also known 
as Shaykh Abu Jandal al-Azdi (nom de plume), replies to queries posted 
to him on the Internet about differences between the first state and the 
contemporary one. His reply outlines how a Muslim should proceed in 
his evaluation of the first state. He glorifies the first state and argues 
that in each family there are those who are good and those who are 
bad. One must distinguish between the good and the debauched from 
among the Al-Saud family. The first state was one that corresponded 
most to the ideal Islamic polity. He lists its assets: making religion tri-
umphant, fighting blasphemy, applying Sharia, and purifying Islam 
from Sufis, philosophers, and innovators. Its unity is derived not from 
the cultural or ethnic characteristics of people, common economic in-
terest, or geographical boundaries, but from belief in one God.
The first state embodied a borderless Salafiyya uncontaminated by 
practices of the contemporary nation-state. Rather than spreading the 
flames of jihad, the contemporary state prohibited it under foreign 
pressure. Furthermore, it opened its territories to foreign troops and al-
lowed military bases to be established in the land of Islam. In addition, 
it allowed istitan, the settlements of foreigners who brought their ways 
of life to sacred space, which should have remained pure and uncon-
taminated by the kafir ways of Christians, Jews, Hindus, and Buddhists. 
Local and global identities
Jihadis who reject the contemporary state accept only two identities, 
one extremely narrow defined in either regional or tribal affiliation, and 
one extremely global defined in a deterritorialized utopia, the Muslim 
ummah. Jihadi ideologue Faris al-Shuwayl clearly articulates this posi-
tion. In a famous letter entitled “Saudi Nationality Under my Foot,” he 
introduces himself as Faris ibn Ahmad ibn Juman ibn Ali al-Shuwayl al-
Hasani al-Zahrani al-Azadi, thus anchoring his identity in Zahran, one 
of the Hijazi Qahtani tribes of contemporary Saudi Arabia. 
Faris al-Shuwayl asserts that he does not recognize Saudi nationality 
in stating: “I am a Muslim among Muslims. I read history and did not 
find something called jinsiyya (nationality). Each Muslim must operate 
in Dar al-Islam wherever he wants and without borders restraining him 
or passports confining him and without a taghut watan (despot nation) 
to worship. My fathers are known, my family is known, my tribe Zahran 
belong to the Azd. Therefore I do not belong to Al-Saud who have no 
right to make people belong to them.”4
Faris al-Shuwayl calls upon the tribes of the Arabian Peninsula to 
remember that the return of their glory will be dependent on their 
return to Islam and rejection of a state that reveals kufr bawah (obvi-
ous blasphemy), governs by rules other than those of God, opens the 
land for Jews and Crusaders, and kills pious Muslims, arrests people of 
knowledge, and steals public wealth. He calls upon the “lions of the 
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“I do not belong to 
Al-Saud who have 
no right to make 
people belong to 
them.” 
Jihadi ideologues in Saudi Arabia are advocates 
of global jihad aiming to establish an Islamic 
world order. At the same time they remain 
closely tied to local Saudi identities. Rejecting 
the national Saudi state and emphasizing 
tribal affiliation, Saudi Jihadis construct 
a discourse in which the Arabian peninsula 
is crucial. Yet when action is concerned, as 
in the pursuit of jihad, the tension between 
the local and the global creates contradictions 
that remain unresolved. 
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Peninsula,” the grandsons of muhajirun, 
early Muslim converts who migrated 
with the Prophet to Medina, and ansar, 
the Medinians who supported them, 
to dissociate themselves from the con-
temporary state. 
Tribal affiliation becomes the first 
important marker of a narrow identity 
that defines the individual and anchors 
him in an old hierarchy of noble tribes, 
whose prestige and standing stem from 
their early historic support for the mes-
sage of the Prophet. While this identity 
is constructed on the basis of kinship 
and blood ties, the tribe acquires local 
significance in the war on blasphemy 
and the purification of the land from 
polytheism. It is incumbent on this nar-
row tribal construction to make Islam 
dominant and hegemonic. The narrow 
local identification should be put at the 
service of the global message. 
From the narrow confines of local 
tribal identity, Faris al-Shuwayl moves 
to the global Muslim ideal, where 
brotherhood is established as a result 
of tawhid, in its spiritual rather than ge-
ographical meaning. In this typology 
of identities that move from the very 
local to the global, there is no space for 
modern constructions such as jinsiyya 
(nationality) and wataniyya (citizen-
ship). Faris al-Shuwayl invites Muslims 
to reject these modern constructions, 
considered as instruments of division between Muslims, whose unity 
cannot be established on common economic interest or any other in-
terest except belief in one God. 
Nationality and citizenship cannot mediate between the very local 
and the very global, as had become the norm and practice in the world. 
There is only one path that can mediate between the local and the glo-
bal. This is the space of jazirat al-Arab or bilad al-haramayn, an identity 
that derives its legitimacy from Arab heritage and sacred space, the two 
holy mosques. The Arabian Peninsula becomes the regional mediator 
between the tribe on the one hand and the ummah on the other hand. 
This model is the only possible and legitimate one. Arab identity, where 
it first emerged in the Arabian Peninsula, becomes a source of pride. 
Between the local and the global
Lewis Atiyat Allah, who has a prominent presence on Jihadi websites, 
advocates global jihad. His vision encompasses an Islamic world order 
that opposes and defies the current international world order labour-
ing under US hegemony.5 His jihad is very much dependent on the 
notion of an Islamic ummah, encompassing different races, nationali-
ties, and cultural groups. The unity of this ummah is derived from faith 
rather than race. However, Lewis Atiyat Allah turns his attention to his 
homeland, the most sacred territory and the core of the Muslim world, 
the “Land of the Two Holy Mosques.” His homeland is central in the es-
tablishment of the Islamic world order, but unfortunately, according to 
Lewis Atiyat Allah, it has become, under the current Saudi leadership, 
a vehicle for Western hegemony. Lewis Atiyat Allah seems to blur the 
boundaries between the so-called national and the transnational Is-
lamists, a dichotomy that has become fashionable in several academic 
studies of the Islamist movement after 9/11. 
When Lewis Atiyat Allah “returns” to bilad al-haramayn, he is trans-
formed into a nationalist who invokes notions of sacred territory, 
historical responsibility, and the glorious past. For Lewis Atiyat Allah 
bilad al-haramayn is not only Mecca and Medina, theoretically closed 
to non-Muslims, but the whole Arabian Peninsula. As such, the land 
of Islam needs to be freed from acts of defilement, manifested in the 
actual physical presence of non-Muslims. This foreign presence en-
compasses not only US soldiers and military bases, but also non-Mus-
lim workers, especially Western expatriates. According to Lewis Atiyat 
Allah, foreigners, obviously regarded as profane, violate the purity 
of this geographical entity. Here the 
boundaries of bilad al-haramayn are 
seen as having become porous, allow-
ing in the process a greater defilement 
and molestation to take place not only 
on the periphery but also in the core of 
this sacred territory. 
He calls upon the “grandsons of the 
companions of the Prophet to expel the 
infidels from jazirat al-arab,” following 
the prophetic tradition. Jazirat al-arab 
is a central term for Lewis Atiyat Allah. 
Syntactically, it invokes “Arab” posses-
sion of a territory, which the descrip-
tive nomenclature al-jazira al-arabiyya 
fails to capture. Furthermore, jazirat al-
arab conveys a different meaning from 
that implied by bilad al-haramayn. The 
first implies the centrality of the Arab 
dimension of the jihad option and the 
historical responsibility of the inhabit-
ants of the Arabian Peninsula to take 
the lead in the struggle. When Lewis 
Atiyat Allah invokes jazirat al-arab, 
there is no doubt that he is an Arab 
nationalist, thus exposing the tension 
between the universal Muslim commu-
nity, the ummah, and the particular, his 
own homeland. He tries to resolve this 
tension by ascribing a central role to his 
own native land, fusing the local—his 
homeland—in the global project, the 
envisaged Islamic world order. 
The centrality of the local in the glo-
bal Jihadi project manifests itself in the desire to cleanse the Arabian 
Peninsula and Arabs from the sin of not only having actively contribut-
ed to the destruction of the Islamic Caliphate in the First World War but 
also of having been the vanguards of this destruction. While the Otto-
man Caliphate is not held to be the desired Islamic Caliphate especially 
in its later years, Jihadis lament its downfall and the Arab contribution 
to its demise. Accordingly, the participation of Saudis in Jihadi projects 
on the periphery of the Muslim ummah (for example in Afghanistan 
and Iraq) is an act of both purification and reclamation of a lost glory. 
Saudi Jihadi discourse and practices create unresolved contradic-
tions. In Saudi Arabia, dissident Jihadis recognize 
only two identities, one originating in tribal affilia-
tion and one in a global Muslim construction with 
the Arabian Peninsula mediating between these 
two distant poles. Other mediating constructions 
such as nationality are rejected as forms of inno-
vation and blasphemy whose main purpose is to 
divide and undermine Muslim unity. However, 
when action is concerned, for example pursuing 
jihad, there is an on-going debate that may not 
be resolved in the near future. Some Saudi Jihadis 
will remain at home to correct the aberration and 
topple the contemporary Saudi state while others 
will choose to pursue jihad abroad as an act of pu-
rification of Arab sins. From afar, they will aspire to 
make Islam once again dominant and hegemonic. 
In pursuing this project, Saudis are called upon to 
play a leading role. Their local identity is para-
mount in the global project, yet the local remains 
problematic, or at least in need of justification. 
Notes
1. This article draws on Madawi Al-Rasheed, 
Contesting the Saudi State: Islamic Voices from 
a New Generation (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007).
2. Although Saudi involvement in Jihadi 
projects abroad was initially state 
sponsored, for example in Afghanistan, it 
later escaped the control of its sponsors.
3. I can only speculate on why this Jihadi chose 
this unusual nom de plume. He explains it as 
resulting from a conversation he had with a 
US immigration officer. When Lewis said that 
his name was Lewis, the immigration officer 
remarked that this name was not the one 
written in the passport, Lewis then replied 
that he was “gonna change it to Lewis.” See 
Al-Rasheed, Contesting the Saudi State, 175-
176.
4. Faris Al-Shuwayl, www.islah.tv.
5. For a full biography, see Al-Rasheed, 
Contesting the Saudi State.
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